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Abstract
■ An important question for understanding the neural basis of
problem solving is whether the regions of human prefrontal
cortices play qualitatively different roles in the major cognitive
restructuring required to solve difficult problems. However, in-
vestigating this question using neuroimaging faces a major di-
lemma: either the problems do not require major cognitive
restructuring, or if they do, the restructuring typically happens
once, rendering repeated measurements of the critical mental
process impossible. To circumvent these problems, young adult
participants were challenged with a one-dimensional Subtraction
(or Nim) problem [Bouton, C. L. Nim, a game with a complete
mathematical theory. The Annals of Mathematics, 3, 35–39,
1901] that can be tackled using two possible strategies. One,
often used initially, is effortful, slow, and error-prone, whereas
the abstract solution, once achieved, is easier, quicker, and more
accurate. Behaviorally, success was strongly correlated with sex.
Using voxel-based morphometry analysis controlling for sex, we
found that participants who found the more abstract strategy
(i.e., Solvers) had more gray matter volume in the anterior me-
dial, ventrolateral prefrontal, and parietal cortices compared
with those who never switched from the initial effortful strategy
(i.e., Explorers). Removing the sex covariate showed higher
gray matter volume in Solvers (vs. Explorers) in the right ventro-
lateral prefrontal and left parietal cortex. ■
INTRODUCTION
Within human experimental psychology the effective study
of problem solving goes back to Selz (1922) and the Gestalt
School. However, its cognitive neuroscience is relatively
new. An outstanding question is whether the left and right
prefrontal cortices play qualitatively different roles in prob-
lem solving. On this issue, Goel (1995) distinguished be-
tween making a “vertical transformation” and a “lateral
transformation” in problem solving. A vertical transforma-
tion is a move in a problem state space to a more detailed
version of the same representation. By contrast Goel held a
lateral transformation to be a move to a new problem state
space. Thus, lateral transformation involves viewing the
problem in new ways (see Figure 1).
Goel and colleagues hypothesized that vertical trans-
formations involve the left pFC and lateral ones the right
(see, e.g., Goel & Grafman, 2000). They conducted a se-
ries of studies to test this hypothesis. In one fMRI study,
Goel and Vartanian (2005) tested whether the right pFC
activated in tackling problems considered to require lat-
eral transformations. They used a version of the so-called
Matchstick Problems (see Figure 1) developed by
Guilford (1967) to measure divergent thinking. In the ex-
perimental condition, a 22-match formation of eight fully
formed squares was presented to the participant. On
each trial, the task was to remove a given number of
matches to leave a specified number of whole squares.
In a baseline condition, a set of matches had already been
crossed out and the participant decided whether removal
of those specified set of matches satisfied the trial goal.
The experimental and baseline conditions clearly differed
in difficulty, so a difficulty rating was developed and used
as a covariate in the analysis. A conjunction analysis was
employed to determine which regions were more acti-
vated both for solving Matchstick Problems versus baseline
and for successful Matchstick Problems versus unsuccess-
ful ones. These regions were the right ventrolateral pFC
(BA 47) and, at weaker significance levels, the left middle
frontal gyrus (BA 9) and the left frontal pole (BA 10).
It was argued that, of these regions, the right ventro-
lateral pFC was especially critical for lateral transforma-
tions, as a neuropsychological study of another version
of the Matchstick task—that of Miller and Tippett
(1996)—had found that patients with right frontal
lesions, particularly right ventrolateral ones, but not
those with left frontal lesions, were impaired on the
Matchstick Problems. Moreover, of the 20 problems each
patient had to tackle, solving five were held to involve a
major shift in strategy. The patients with right frontal
lesions and also right central-parietal lesions were signif-
icantly inferior to normal controls on these major set shift
problems. Consequently, Goel and Vartanian (2005) con-
cluded that the integrity of right BA 47 was necessary
for the lateral transformations involved in Matchstick
Problems.
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However, this thesis faces three difficulties. First, it is
intuitively highly plausible that some Matchstick Prob-
lems do involve lateral transformations, as their use in
studies of divergent thinking indicates. However, al-
though Goel and Vartanian (2005) refer to support from
unpublished pilot studies, they provided no formal em-
pirical evidence that Matchstick Problems actually do in-
volve lateral transformations (see Lee & Johnson-Laird,
2013, for an empirical analysis of Matchstick Problems
using an alternative conceptual approach). Moreover, as
each participant tackles 20 experimental and 20 baseline
problems in Goel and Vartanian’s study, one does not
know how many trials involve a new lateral transforma-
tion. Second, although Miller and Tippett’s (1996) right
frontal patients were indeed impaired on the major set
shift problems, they were also impaired, although to a
lesser extent, on nonmajor set shift problems, suggesting
that some other aspect of the task may also be relevant.
One possibility could concern the spatial processing
since square detection loads on that type of operation.
However, this possibility is somewhat reduced as
Vartanian and Goel (2005) have also found BA 47 to be
activated in an anagram solution task, which does not
have such a clear spatial component.
Most critically, it is not even obvious what exactly a
lateral transformation is. In the Goel and Vartanian
(2005) study, lateral transformations are identified with
Guilford’s (1967) “set shifts” to overcome a cognitive
fixation (see Figure 1). However, simple set shifting,
as in paradigms like task switching, tends to involve
more superior structures than BA 47 (Derrfuss, Brass,
Neumann, & von Cramon, 2005). Moreover, concep-
tually, as Goel and Vartanian point out, something more
than simple set shifting appears to be required when
solving difficult Matchstick Problems. Some implicit con-
straint in the way the participant tackles a task has to be
removed (see Figure 1). So Matchstick Problems are
often viewed as insight problems with their solution in-
volving two stages (Knoblich, Ohlsson, & Raney, 2001).
There is an initial stage, in which a state of impasse oc-
curs “due to a high probability of triggering an initial
mental representation that has a low probability of lead-
ing to the solution” (Knoblich et al., 2001, p. 1001). This
stage is depicted in Figure 1 by the several inadequate
solutions in the lower left corner. This is eventually
followed by what is typically a rapid process of reorgani-
zation of the problem space (e.g., the realization that “re-
maining squares do not have to be the same size”).
According to Knoblich et al., the second stage occurs
through the relaxation of inappropriate constraints, but
Goel (2009) sees a more active process as necessary
when claiming that the right pFC is critical in generating
novel possibilities. This type of major set shift is now often
called “restructuring” (e.g., Sandkühler & Bhattacharya,
2008; Ohlsson, 1992) and corresponds to Goel’s “lateral
transformations.”
How, though, does one assess whether a major re-
structuring process has occurred? This is necessary as,
if one uses a set of problems of the same general type,
once a solution is achieved, any similar problem, from
Figure 1. An example of
a Matchstick problem and the
difference between lateral
and vertical transformation.
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then on, would not require the same type of, what we will
call, major problem restructuring. It would merely require
a minor adaptation of the achieved procedure. Thus, once
a problem has been solved, encountering subsequent
problems of the same nature with the restructured mental
representations setup will trigger the appropriate solution.
One possibility for recognizing and identifying a mo-
ment of restructuring is to use self-reports. Sandkühler
and Bhattacharya (2008) did this in an EEG study of the
so called remote association problems (e.g., which word
goes with “back, clip, wall”? Answer: “paper”), which only
have a limited degree of complexity; we term such de-
signs small-scale verbal restructuring. However, when
one is solved, this does not greatly help in solving the
next. These authors found that there was a strong trend
for reduced EEG alpha power over the right frontal lobe
just before production of solutions that were reported to
have required restructuring. But there were no frontal ef-
fects related to ratings of the impasse state or the rated
rapidity of solutions. However, source analysis was not
used, so one cannot be certain that the critical process
involved was indeed located in the right frontal lobe.
For more discussion of small-scale verbal restructuring,
see Kounios and Beeman (2014).
A summary of the existing literature indicates that
major problem restructuring is nontrivial to study and
that appropriate tasks have rarely been used. In particu-
lar, the key hypothesis derived from the work of Goel’s
group on whether right ventrolateral pFC has a key role
in problem restructuring remains to be tested.
One way to study major problem restructuring specif-
ically would be to use a very small number of qualitatively
different problems, indeed ideally only one, in which the
two-stage process discussed by Knoblich et al. (2001) reli-
ably and observably occurs across a good percentage of
participants. In a recent study, Seyed-Allaei, Amati, and
Shallice (2010) examined a variant of the two-player game
called Nim or the Subtraction Game (Bouton, 1901) and
showed that this game had the desired properties (see
also Hawes, Vostroknutov, & Rustichini, 2012).
Traditionally, Nim or the Subtraction Game was played
with heaps of stones. Each player could take any number
of stones up to a given maximum. The player to take the
last stone won. In the current version, in the Subtraction
Game G(n,k), which is mathematically isomorphic to that
involving heaps of stones but strategically more transpar-
ent, players take turns in moving a pawn along a linear
track of total length n squares. On each turn, a player
must move, but only by up to a maximum number, k,
of squares (see Figure 2). In the G(15,3) example in
Figure 2, the first player starts by choosing from among
the first three squares (1, 2, 3) and lands on 2. The next
Figure 2. An example game
of G(15,3) is shown on the
left with the solution on the
right. The critical positions
for winning the G(15,3) game
are 3, 7, and 11. Because the
participant starts the game,
if they figure out this strategy
(first occupying 3, then 7 and
then 11), they will always win.
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player chooses one from the next three squares (3, 4, and
5) and lands on 5. The winner is the player who moves
the pawn onto the last square of the track (square 15)
first. Seyed-Allaei et al. (2010) had participants play the
Subtraction Game, not against another human opponent,
but against a computer. Participants made the first move
and so could always win if they used the correct strategy.
In the initial trials, though, most participants started
searching the problem state space by trying to calculate
forward toward their eventual goal. However, although
the state space is well defined, it is far too large to be
explored exhaustively. Many participants, however, grad-
ually realized that certain squares (for G(15,3), these
would be 3, 7, and 11) were better than others and tried
to land on them. After playing a number of rounds of the
game using such working forward procedures, some of
these participants realized that a simple arithmetic proce-
dure which involves working backward from the final
square (see Figure 2, right column) can be used to deter-
mine the critical squares on which they should attempt to
land. The participants who came to this much more effi-
cient solution were called “Solvers” in contrast with “Ex-
plorers” who kept attempting just to work forward from
the starting point. The difference between Solvers and
Explorers is the strategy they use to win. Explorers are
a mixed group also, including participants that have
vaguely realized the importance of some or all of the crit-
ical positions through trial and error, but they did not
know why those positions lead to a win.
The transition from intermittent success to continuously
perfect performance in the typical Solver participant was
shown by Seyed-Allaei et al. (2010) in three ways. Average
RT for moves dropped and remained consistently low. In
addition, the trajectory of mouse movements used on
the trials during transition showed backward calculation.
Moreover, participants’ ability to verbalize their reasoning
for the solution procedure at the end of the experiment
indicated the conscious, rule-based nature of the successful
strategy. We even observed a sudden “Aha!” reaction in
some Solvers in their recorded voice, which was highly
predictive of the change in strategy. Therefore, we believe
that it is possible to determine the switch trial, if a partici-
pant is a Solver, reliably by examining the RT decline and
performance surge.
Thus, this task permits a distinction between before
and after the moment of problem restructuring, which
could be used to identify its neural substrates. But such
a single trial approach would be impractical with most
neuropsychological and neuroimaging methodologies.
Too many patients with lesions in the relevant area would
be required for a neuropsychological assessment with
reasonable power. It is also impractical to study major
problem restructuring by conventional neuroimaging
methods, for these methods require multiple repetitions
of critical trials per participant and averaging across
participants to segregate the signal from noise in the
imaging data.
In this study, we have taken another approach. Instead
of averaging across numerous participants to filter out
the interindividual differences in behavior and brain, we
chose to utilize the extensive individual variations that
were previously observed in the Subtraction Game. Im-
portantly, Seyed-Allaei et al. (2010) reported that 42%
of their participants who played the Subtraction Game
never discovered the backward solution and those who
did showed great variation in how many trials they
needed to find it. The restructuring occurred, on average,
after the participant had played 19.2 rounds, but with in-
dividuals spanning a wide range from 3 to 28 rounds.
Given the considerable degree of variation that exists in
the local brain neuroanatomy of healthy normal adults,
we asked whether the interindividual differences ob-
served in problem restructuring (Seyed-Allaei et al.,
2010) could be indicative of systematic variations in the
local brain structure in human pFC. This method has now
been used successfully to address a wide range of ques-
tions in cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Kanai, Bahrami, &
Rees, 2010; Mechelli et al., 2005; Maguire et al., 2000).
Specifically, we hypothesized that successful changes of
strategy would be associated with local regional differ-
ences in gray and/or white matter in pFC. We tested this
hypothesis by using voxel-based morphometry to com-
pare the problem Solvers (i.e., those who successfully
restructured the problem to arrive at the optimal solu-
tion) with problem Explorers (who kept trying out heu-
ristics without ever arriving at the ideal solution).
METHODS
Participants
Seventy-six healthy adults (41 women, mean age =
22.61 years, SD = 2.23 years) participated in the study.
The participants were all medical students at Shahid
Beheshti University and University of Tehran. The exper-
iment was approved by the local ethics committee at the
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences.
Behavioral Task and Analysis
We used the Subtraction Game, also known as the one-
dimensional Nim game G(n,k), a two-player game with
an optimal strategy, formalized by Bouton (1901). On
each trial (Figure 2), the players take turns in moving a
pawn by up to k squares in a linear array of n squares.
The player that moves into the nth square wins the
game. In Figure 2, the number of maximum move or k
is 3, and the number of positions or n is 15. If the player
who starts the game knows the winning strategy for the
game’s n and k, they will always win and the player going
second has no way to stop player 1.
The winning strategy involves identifying the critical
squares by backward induction that guarantees winning
(Figure 2): To guarantee that one will be able to move
to square n on the ith move ( posi = n), one should
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aim to arrive at square posi − 1 = n − 1 − k on the pre-
ceding (i − 1)th move. From that square one’s opponent
can only move to n − k, n − k + 1, …, n − 1, thus en-
abling one to reach square n on the following move and
so win the game. Thus, posi − 1 is a critical (winning)
square. Back propagation of the same procedure shows
that an equivalent situation is present for posi − 2 = n −
2(k + 1) and so on. In this way, one can identify the set
of critical squares pos1, pos2,…, posi, where 0 ≤ pos1 ≤ k.
If n is divisible by k + 1, then pos1 = 0 and the second
player can always win (by moving to pos2 = k + 1 what-
ever the initial move of the first player); by contrast if 1 ≤
pos1 ≤ k, the player who starts can move through a series
of winning squares and so win the game in i moves.
Participants played the game against the computer,
starting the game on all trials. As in Seyed-Allaei et al.
(2010), participants played 15 trials of G(15, 3) followed
by 15 trials of G(17, 4). In G(15,3), the player who
reaches position 15 first wins the game (see Figure 2).
Every player can move 1, 2, or 3 positions forward in
one turn. Therefore, if player A is on square 11, the op-
ponent can only go as far as 12, 13, or 14, all of which
would let player A reach position 15 in her next move.
Therefore, player A’s goal to reach 15 translates into land-
ing in 11, that is, 15 − (3 + 1). By backward induction, to
reach position 11, player A has to land in position 7 and
before that in position 3. Following this strategy, as long
as player A starts the game and lands in position 3, there
is no way she could lose (Figure 2). Each G(n,k) has a set
of such critical positions that ensure the starting player’s
victory; for G(15,3) they are (3, 7, 11), and for G(17,4)
they are (2, 7, 12).
The computer always played perfectly: If at any point
in the game, the participant did not occupy the critical
square available to them, then the computer would im-
mediately occupy it, and from then on, the participant
could not win the game. For example, in G(15,3), if the
participant did not start by occupying square 3 but in-
stead moved to 2, then the computer would seize the op-
portunity and move to square 3, and from there proceed
to win the game. This ensured that participants could not
win the game by random guessing, but only if they knew
exactly what position to choose. In addition, this
extremely opportunistic virtual opponent can serve to
familiarize the participants with the concept of critical
positions (Seyed-Allaei et al., 2010).
To categorize the participants as Solvers versus
Explorers, a questionnaire was administered at the end
of experiment. The participants were asked to write
down the strategy they used in both games and also what
they would use in a third game G(19,5). An example of
written answer referring to the second game, from an
Explorer is: “I started from low numbers like 1 or 2. Then
from 7 I could go to 12 and win.” A Solver, on the other
hand, had written: “First I tried to understand the pattern
of computer moves. Then I realized it is not necessary.
After losing 6 times in the second game I realized there
are critical positions. These positions were 4 + 1 apart.
Thus to always win we should occupy 17 − 5 = 12,
12 − 5 = 7 and 7 − 5 = 2.” This answer was followed
by the correct solution to G(19,5). The explicit reference
to critical positions in the answer to the questionnaire
was the key to categorizing participants as Solver versus
Explorer. Those who performed correctly on at least the
last trial and solved G(19,5) correctly were categorized as
Solvers and the others as Explorers. Protocols were as-
sessed independently by two authors before the MRI
analysis. There was a 100% agreement between the raters
in categorizing participants as Solvers or Explorers.
Within Solvers, the specific moment of strategy change
(the switch trial) was defined as the trial after which all
subsequent moves were correct and their average RT
within the same game were less than 6 sec. This criterion
was adopted from Seyed-Allaei et al. (2010), where two
independent judges also examined the mouse move-
ments and the recorded voice to identify the switch trial.
Seyed-Allaei et al. (2010) showed that the conclusions
from judges and debriefings during and after the games
were consistent with RT decline and flawless perfor-
mance after the switch.
Data Acquisition and Preprocessing
High-resolution anatomical images of the whole brain
were acquired using 1.5 T MAGNETOM Avanto scanner
(Siemens, Erlangen, Germany; 160 axial slice, 1 mm thick,
echo time = 3.5 msec, repetition time = 12 msec). The
images were processed using DARTEL (Ashburner, 2007).
First, the images were segmented for gray matter and white
matter via a rigid body. Then the nonlinear deformations
for warping the images were determined. The images were
then smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (FWHM = 12 mm)
and normalized to MNI space with preserving the amount
of voxels (modulated). The resulting images represent the
regional volume of gray matter and white matter.
Voxel-based Morphometry Analysis
We performed statistical analyses on local regional differ-
ences in gray and white matter volume by fitting a gen-
eral linear model to data using Statistical Parametric
Mapping (SPM8, www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). In the first
analysis, a t test was performed to compare Solvers
versus Explorers gray and white matter volumes. In the
second analysis, we introduced covariates of no interest
for sex using ANCOVA. We followed these up by ad-
ditional inclusion of participants’ accuracy and mathemat-
ical ability as covariates of no interest. Accuracy was
defined as the grand-averaged accuracy before switch
moment. Consequently, for Explorers, accuracy was cal-
culated over all trials (because they never reached the
switch moment), whereas for Solvers, accuracy was calcu-
lated over the trials preceding the switch. Mathematical
ability was assessed by collecting the participants’ grades
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in mathematics in the national university entrance exam-
ination. Similar to the sex covariate, we introduced
accuracy as a covariate of no interest using ANCOVA. Sep-
arately, we explored the effect of accuracy alone in a re-
gression analysis. Similarly, we analyzed the effect of
mathematical ability in two ways: first, as a covariate of
no interest in an ANCOVA and, second, by balancing
the mathematical scores in the two groups by removing
nine participants with the top math scores (all were
Solvers) so that the two groups have comparable scores.
In all analyses, a threshold mask of 0.1 was used to re-
move the background noise and global normalization
was omitted. The results were corrected for multiple
comparisons at p ≤ .05 using family-wise error correction.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Seventy-six healthy adults (41 women), 20–32 years old
(22.61 ± 2.2 years, female age = 22.90 ± 2.41 years, male
age = 22.26 ± 1.95 years), participated in the study. Forty-
one participants (14 women) were categorized as Solvers
and 35 participants (27 women) as Explorers. The behav-
ioral plots of one Explorer and one Solver are shown in
Figure 3. Behavioral data of an Explorer and a Solver. RT is averaged over moves within a trial and plotted for all trials. The winning trials are filled
with black circles. The vertical dashed line separates the first and the second game. The horizontal dashed line is the 6-sec threshold for RT
decline. The switch trial is indicated with an asterisk.
Figure 4. Average RTs and performance. (A, B) The time series of RT and performance averaged trial by trial in Explorers and Solvers. (C, D) The
time series of performance and RT in Solvers and Explorers are aligned to their individual switch trial for Solvers and the hypothetical switch trial for
Explorers.
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Figure 3. There was no significant age difference between
Solvers and Explorers (two-tailed t test, t = 0.25, p = .8),
but there was a significant sex difference in proportion of
Solvers and Explorers (Fisher exact test, p < .0001).
To show the typical behavior of Solvers, we aligned the
time series of all Solvers to the switch trial to compute
average RT and performance. To compare Solvers and
Explorers, we aligned the Explorers’ RT and performance
to a hypothetical switch point that was defined as follows:
the start of the last sequence of wins in which RT is also
below the 6-sec threshold. The first trial of the second
game is removed from this analysis. In Figure 4, the time
series of average RT and performance are plotted. Con-
sistently successful performance and RT decline (by def-
inition) as reflected in the time series after restructuring.
On average, Solvers took around 21.47 (SD = 7.13) tri-
als to find the winning strategy. The distribution of switch
trials is shown in Figure 5. Before a strategy shift occurs,
Solvers played correctly on 60.4% of the trials (SD =
16.96) and took in average11.64 sec per move (SD =
10.08). Explorers played correctly in 32.63% of the trials
(SD = 16.72%) and took in average 9.25 sec per move
(SD = 6.31). Thus, Solvers landed on critical positions
at a higher rate. The difference in performance before
the switch is significant (t test, t = 7.08, p < .0001),
but the difference in RT is not significant (11.45 vs.
9.25, SD = 10.08 vs. 6.31, t test, t = 1.43; p = .15). In-
spection of Figure 4 shows that over the first trials 1–4
Solvers performed little better than Explorers (53.57 vs.
40.91, SD = 28.99 vs. 26.38, t test, t = 1.95, p = .054).
Moreover, the efficiency (accuracy/RT) of the two groups
was equivalent (t test, t = 0.09, p = .92). There is no sig-
nificant difference between RT in trials 1–4 (t test, t= 1.7,
p = .9). However, the Solvers took longer than Explorers
to make their moves in losing trials (t test, t = 2.81, p =
.0055). In addition, male Solvers (mean switch trial 19.07,
SD = 7.69) discovered the correct strategy earlier than
female Solvers (mean switch trial 24.92, SD = 5.54, t test,
p < .004). The distribution of switch trials for Solvers is
plotted in Figure 5.
To understand if Solvers could be considered better
problem solvers in general, in a follow-up analysis we col-
lected mathematics and physics grades of the national
university entrance examination for 66 available partici-
pants (Figure 6). The top 9 mathematics scores belonged
to Solvers. The difference between Solvers and Explorers
is significant for Mathematics (two-tailed t test, t = 2.60,
p = .01) but not Physics grades (two-tailed t test, t =
1.50, p = .13).
Voxel-based Morphometry Analysis
An initial test was carried out to compare the gray matter
volume of the Solvers versus Explorers (Figure 7). Voxels
with family-wise error corrected p values less than or
equal to .05 are reported in Table 1. Significant differ-
ences were found in the left angular/supramarginal gyrus,
right precuneus, right angular gyrus, and the mid tempo-
ral gyrus in the left hemisphere. Most importantly, gray
matter volume was significantly higher in Solvers in the
right but not the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47). No
significant differences were obtained for Explorers versus
Solvers. The same comparison for the white matter vol-
ume shows significant difference in the left occipital and
in the right parietal lobe (Figure 7; Table 1) for Solvers
versus Explorers. The reverse contrast did not show
any significant differences.
Figure 6. The histogram of Mathematics and Physics grades of Solvers and Explorers in the national university entrance examination.
Figure 5. The histogram of switch trial in Solvers.
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Given the sex difference observed in the behavior, the
observed correlation might be related to differences of
brain structure between the two sexes. To discover
whether the differences found between Solvers and
Explorers were entirely due to sex or not, we included
sex as covariates of no interest in a second analysis
using ANCOVA. The results are reported in Figure 8 and
Tables 2 and 3. Reassuringly, partialing out the impact of
sex substantially reinforced the results. In Solvers, gray
matter volume was higher in a swathe of areas in MPFC in-
cluding BA 10, BA 11, and BA 32 extending to bilateral
BA 47. Similarly, white matter volume in Solvers was higher
around MPFC (BA 10 and BA 11), an area surrounded by
BA 9, BA 8, and BA 32 and bilateral areas close to BA 47.
Figure 7. Brain areas where
gray and white matter volumes
were higher in Solvers versus
Explorers. A threshold of T >
3.8 was used for visualization
purposes. See Table 1 for
statistical values.
Table 1. MNI Coordinates for Voxels Showing Significantly Higher Gray/White Matter Volume in Solvers versus Explorers
( p ≤ .05, FWE-corrected) Given in Millimeters with Effect Sizes (z Scores)
Region BA x y z z Score Cluster Size pFWE-corr
Solvers vs. Explorers (Gray Matter Volume)
L angular gyrus 7 −38 −69 51 4.52 157 .01
R precuneus 7 9 −67 37 4.56 126 .01
R precuneus 23 14 −58 27 4.42 126 .02
R angular gyrus 39/40 40 −51 33 4.44 24 .02
L mid temporal gyrus 39 −58 −70 16 4.27 3 .04
R precuneus 7 10 −78 57 4.24 2 .05
R inferior frontal gyrus 47 54 28 −17 4.24 1 .05
Solvers vs. Explorers (White Matter Volume)
L occipital lobe BA 18 −3 −79 9 5.41 443 <.001
R parietal lobe BA 7 16 −69 51 4.40 2 .04
Nearest cortical area are reported for white matter.
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Direct comparison of male Solvers with female Solvers
indicated several regions that were significantly different
in gray matter volume. These regions included the left
parietal and the right BA 47. In addition, mid temporal,
bilateral BA 46, and dorsolateral pFC were different
in male versus female Solvers. However, only the mid
temporal region was also present when comparing male
Explorers with female Explorers. No region was found for
the reverse contrasts, that is, female versus male
(Solvers/Explorers), and also no region was found for
the interactions.
Because Solvers performed better than Explorers even
before the switch, one possible explanation is that the
number of correct trials alone and not solving per se
could account for the difference we observed. To explore
this possibility, we did a multiple regression analysis with
accuracies on structural images. For Solvers, we used av-
erage performance before the switch, and for Explorers,
the average performance in all trials. The overall result is
weaker for accuracy regression, and only the left parietal
cluster survives the multiple comparison correction (x =
−38, y = −88, z = 28; z = 4.23, k = 4, p = .04).
Although accuracy and solving are highly correlated,
the small overlap between the groups (Explorers that
performed better and Solvers that performed worse be-
fore switch) led to the loss of frontal findings. We have
also investigated the effect of a measure of performance
that is less correlated with Solving but might be causally
related to Solving. A similar multiple regression analysis
was done with the number of wins before restructuring
for Solvers and the total number of wins for Explorers. No
significant cluster was present, strengthening our original
claim that preswitch performance measures on their own
cannot account for the frontal Solving localizations. In an-
other analysis, we compared Solvers and Explorers by in-
troducing accuracy before switch as a covariate of no
interest using ANCOVA. The gray matter volume in the
left BA 47 (peak: x = 36, y = 24, z = −17; z = 4.89,
p = .008) and all the posterior regions including the pa-
rietal regions (peak: x = −36, y = −67, z = 51; z = 5.21,
p = .002) survived this analysis. Additionally, we found a
difference in MPFC (peak: x=−14, y= 35, z=−12; z =
4.55, p = .033) and the left frontopolar cortex (peak: x =
−38, y = 63, z = 12; z = 5.58, p < .001).
To find out whether general problem-solving ability
could explain the difference between Solvers and Ex-
plorers, we added mathematics scores as a covariate of
no interest using ANCOVA. The results were similar to
the sex analysis and the network of regions found
previously survived in this analysis as well. Additionally,
we found that the top 9 mathematics scores belong to
Solvers. Removing these participants resulted in Solvers
and Explorers with similar average math scores (49.5 ±
17.59 vs. 46.41 ± 16.30; t test, t = 0.69, p = .49). By com-
paring the Solvers and Explorers in this analysis, again the
left parietal (peak: x = −38, y = −70, z = 56; z = 4.46,
p = .025) and right BA 47 (peak: x = 45, y = 38, z = −5;
z = 4.44, p = .028) survived the statistical threshold. A
summary of these analysis and their results are shown
in Table 4.
Figure 8. The difference of gray
matter and white matter volume
in Solvers versus Explorers
including the sex covariates of
no interest. A threshold of
T > 5 was used for visualization
purposes. See Tables 2 and 3
for statistical values.
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DISCUSSION
In this article, we employed a novel behavioral approach
with the aim of producing evidence on the anatomical
correlates of what we have characterized as the major
problem restructuring process. Our paradigm fulfilled
four properties (Seyed-Allaei et al., 2010):
I. Problem restructuring was preceded by an initial im-
passe in problem solving. Choices were consistently
slow and unsuccessful during this period.
II. Solving the problem entailed a significant novel un-
derstanding of the problem description (Figure 2)
that corresponded to major restructuring of the
problem state space—which corresponds to Goel’s
(1995) “lateral transformations.”
III. The restructuring was achieved suddenly. Choices
were consistently fast and successful after restruc-
turing.
IV. Substantial individual differences were observed be-
tween participants; nearly half of our participants did
not succeed in figuring out the solution in 30 trials.
Table 2. MNI Coordinates for Significant Gray Matter Voxels in
Solvers versus Explorers Including Sex as Covariate of No
Interest Using ANCOVA ( p ≤ .05, FWE-corrected) Given in
Millimeters with Effect Sizes (z Scores)
Solvers vs. Explorers Using Sex Covariate
(Gray Matter Volume)
Region BA x y z
Cluster
Size z-Score
pFWE-
corr
L superior medial
gyrus
10 −6 66 28 31584 6.70 <.001
L superior medial
gyrus
9 −5 54 38 31584 6.30 <.001
L superior medial
gyrus
32 −14 35 27 31584 6.00 <.001
L ACC 24 −2 26 35 31584 5.87 <.001
L ACC 32 0 35 30 31584 5.83 <.001
L superior orbital
gyrus
11 −17 51 −8 31584 5.73 <.001
R superior medial
gyrus
32 9 54 24 31584 5.69 <.001
L superior frontal
gyrus
46 −29 56 26 31584 5.68 <.001
R angular gyrus 39 45 −60 42 1426 6.03 <.001
R precuneus 7 8 −68 38 1653 5.80 <.001
R precuneus 23 12 −56 27 1653 4.98 .005
L angular gyrus 7 −38 −68 45 825 5.75 <.001
R middle frontal
gyrus
45 45 41 20 273 4.95 .006
L superior
temporal gyrus
48 −44 −9 −9 41 4.77 .013
L middle frontal
gyrus
45 −32 41 17 11 4.67 .02
L calcarine gyrus 17 −5 −101 8 39 4.65 .02
L cerebelum
(Crus 1)
19 −50 −68 −17 41 4.9496 .02
L inferior parietal
lobule
40 −60 −44 44 4 4.46 .04
Table 3. MNI Coordinates for Significant White Matter Voxels
in Solvers versus Explorers Including Sex as Covariate of No
Interest Using ANCOVA ( p ≤ .05, FWE-corrected) Given in
Millimeters with Effect Sizes (z Scores)
Solvers vs. Explorers Using Sex Covariate
(White Matter Volume)
Nearest BA x y z Cluster Size z-Score pFWE-corr
10 −12 62 21 2427 6.22 <.001
11 3 35 −14 3750 5.71 <.001
47 −29 23 −5 2463 5.70 <.001
18/19 26 −57 25 646 5.11 .002
32 9 −20 45 87 5.10 .002
17 −10 −81 7 240 4.84 .006
48 38 −16 13 53 4.72 .011
47 35 42 6 84 4.64 .015
19 26 −67 −3 29 4.53 .023
11 −6 41 3 15 4.49 .027
7 16 −67 51 7 4.49 .027
24/32 −8 23 30 13 4.47 .029
19/21/37 36 −49 9 37 4.46 .031
Table 4. Summary of Regions with Significantly More Gray
Matter Volume in Different Analyses
Solvers vs.
Explorers
R Inferior
Frontal
Gyrus
Medial
Frontal
L Angular
Gyrus/
Intraparietal R Precuneus
Without
covariates
X – X X
Accuracy
ANCOVA
X X X X
Math ANCOVA X X X X
Excluded high
Math scores
X – X –
Sex
ANCOVA
X X X X
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These four features ensured that our paradigm was well
suited for assessing the localization of systems underlying
major problem restructuring using neuroimaging based
on individual differences (Kanai & Rees, 2011). However,
the cognitive processes responsible for many aspects of
carrying out the specific task other than those involved
specifically in major problem restructuring will also be
picked up by our methodology. In particular, carrying
out the task involves some very basic spatial processing
and, more critically, simple arithmetic. Each player can
move between 1 and 3 squares at each turn and the
critical rule that has to be discovered involves realizing that
critical squares are four (i.e., 1 +maximum step size) apart.
Moreover, major problem restructuring may depend in
part on processes occurring before the event itself, which
we will call pre-restructuring ones (see below).
To differentiate the neuronal substrates linked to gen-
eral aspects of task execution versus major problem re-
structuring versus pre-restructuring, we carried out a
number of subsidiary analyses. We covaried for the effect
overall accuracy of the participant (before major restruc-
turing). We also controlled for mathematical ability in two
different ways. We first added mathematical ability as a
covariate to the general linear model. In a further analy-
sis, as the nine highest participants on mathematical abil-
ity were all Solvers, we removed these participants, which
left the Modified Solver group at close to the mathemat-
ical ability of the Explorer group, and then compared the
Modified Solver and Explorer groups directly.
Our results showed that three regions at least may be
critically involved in successfully carrying out the task—
left inferior parietal area, the right precuneus, and the
right inferior frontal area. The left inferior parietal area
appears to stretch from the inferior parietal lobule into
the superior parietal lobule. This is, of course, a primary
area for number processing and also for calculation
(Arsalidou & Taylor, 2011; Hubbard, Piazza, Pinel, &
Dehaene, 2005; Dehaene, Spelke, Pinel, Stanescu, &
Tsivkin, 1999). However, the involvement of this area in
our study survives covarying for overall accuracy and math-
ematical ability and also is found when the Modified Solver
group is used. Thus, it may well be involved in the major
problem restructuring process itself or pre-restructuring.
A second area that survived the statistical threshold of sig-
nificance was the right precuneus. However, when we
excluded the high math score subjects to produce the
Modified Solver group, the right precuneus region is no
longer found. We will therefore not consider it further.
The one frontal area where solving the problem was
significantly correlated with gray matter volume was in-
deed right ventrolateral pFC (BA 47). In the Arsalidou
and Taylor (2011), meta-analysis only considerably higher
regions of the right lateral frontal cortex were involved in
either number processing or calculation. Thus, even a
task like the Brixton Spatial Anticipation test where good
performance requires both spatial and abstraction pro-
cesses as well as numerical ones does not give rise to
BA 47 activations (Crescentini et al., 2011).
By contrast, the BA 47 area found in our study was
close to the coordinates, also in BA 47, obtained by Goel
and Vartanian (2005) and Vartanian and Goel (2005) in
their functional activation studies of Matchstick Problems
and anagram problems, respectively. This was where they
held that systems responsible for lateral transformations
were located. Thus, our results corroborated the predic-
tion of Goel and Vartanian and indirectly provide some
support for their interpretation of their findings.
However, two aspects of the behavioral results pro-
duced complications for the simple picture that systems
in the right lateral prefrontal (BA 47) are where the crit-
ical processes responsible for major problem restructur-
ing are located. First, as alluded to earlier, there are
differences in the performance of the Solvers and Ex-
plorers groups before any strategy switch. Second, there
is a prominent sex effect.
Thus, major problem restructuring appears to show up
as an all-or-none change in behavior at a certain time—
that of the “Aha” experience. The first complication for
the simple interpretation of the role of BA 47 presented
above is that any process occurring at this time is likely to
have been preceded by other related ones. It is well
known that, in difficult problem solving, conscious and
possibly unconscious mental processes like incubation
may facilitate the occurrence of a later insightful leap
(Sio & Ormerod, 2009; Woodworth & Schlosberg,
1955). Thus, Duncker (1935) alludes to the solution of
complex problems being preceded by steps with increas-
ing degrees of “partial insight.” Ruger (1910) in his study
of insightful problem solving describes so-called “locus
analysis” where the participant notices the place or part
of a puzzle where success has occurred on some trials.
Our observations are consistent with these ideas. Many
participants learn to land on the critical squares before
they solve the problem exhaustively. Moreover, in our
study the longer a participant takes to consider her op-
tions before a strategy switch, the better is the opportu-
nity to learn which the critical squares are.
Indeed, in the current study the performance of
Solvers and Explorers differs before the strategy switch
point as well as after it. The accuracy of Solvers is better
than that of Explorers even before the restructuring
point. It is therefore highly plausible that critical pre-
restructuring processes differ between the two groups.
More specifically, the two groups show comparable suc-
cess rates over the first few trials. However, Solvers take
longer over these unsuccessful initial trials. After that per-
formance diverges. This finding offers an interesting pos-
sibility about the difference in the cognitive basis of
problem solving in Solvers and Explorers. When in the
initial trials, Solvers take more time they perhaps think
more deeply about the problem. Explorers, on the other
hand, seem to approach the task by trial and error, trying
out one action after another at a steady rate. In any case,
Solvers land on the critical squares at a higher rate than
do Explorers. They may be said to be more effective at
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Ruger’s “locus analysis.” It is therefore highly plausible
that critical pre-restructuring processes differ between
the two groups.
With the current methodology, one cannot differenti-
ate the neural correlates of major problem restructuring
processes from any pre-restructuring ones. However, one
can examine whether measures that are more closely
linked to hypothetical pre-restructuring processes than
restructuring ones themselves give similar functional lo-
calizations to those found in the basic analyses. When
this is done using the average performance before a
switch as the measure or using the number of correct tri-
als, then left parietal effects are found for average perfor-
mance before the switch but no frontal effects are found.
This suggests that the left parietal region may contribute
to the pre-restructuring processes. Indirectly, it makes
the linking of major problem restructuring processes
themselves to the BA 47 region more plausible. It, how-
ever, does not rule out the possibility that the variability
in the left parietal region signifies cognitive processes
concerned with major problem restructuring itself. In-
deed, the involvement of a network of brain areas in such
processes is highly plausible. This is consistent with what
is known about parietal cortex’s role in numerical cogni-
tion. In a task where the novel strategy involves calcula-
tion, regions critical for calculation must be involved for
problem restructuring, unless the processing they under-
take is completely mimicked in more frontal regions,
which seems unlikely.
There was a second complication that needs to be taken
into account before accepting the simple picture that
systems in the right ventrolateral pFC (BA 47) are where
the critical processes responsible for major problem re-
structuring are located. Male participants comprised 66%
(27/41) of the Solvers, but only 23% (8/35) of the
Explorers. In addition, male Solvers arrived at the solution
with less trials on average than do female Solvers. This
raises the possibility that sex constitutes a confound for
our measure of problem restructuring and the results
reported above could be influenced by the difference in
sex distribution. In a further analysis, we used ANCOVA
to partial out the impact of sex by including sex as a
covariate in our general linear model. If our results
were primarily due to the difference in sex distri-
butions, then the correlation between gray matter
volume in right BA 47 and behavioral label (Solver vs.
Explorer) should be wiped out or substantially reduced.
In fact, the results were substantially strengthened
(Tables 2 and 3; Figure 8). Once the confounding ef-
fects of sex were removed, a long vertical swathe of an-
terior medial rostral pFC (BA 10 and BA 11) and two
roughly symmetrical extensions bilaterally into BA 47
showed strong correlations with problem restructuring.
Most importantly, in addition to the two posterior re-
gions found in the basic analysis, the peak BA 47 voxel
found in the first analysis was within this extension into
BA 47 as was the equivalent region in left BA 47. This
analysis therefore provided evidence that our findings
were not confounded by sex distribution.
Two additional analyses supported this idea. The com-
parison of male Solvers with female Solvers showed that
gray matter differences were found in a number of re-
gions including both the right ventrolateral frontal and
the left inferior parietal. This is compatible with male
Solvers finding a solution on average before female
Solvers. However, when male Explorers were compared
with female Explorers, neither of these regions were
among those that show differences. However, it should
be noted that no regions were found when the interac-
tion was tested.
We have argued that the left inferior parietal region
would be expected to be involved in problem restructur-
ing with this task. Why should bilateral BA 47 and the an-
terior medial rostral pFC swathe also be regions involved
in succeeding at the Subtraction Game? It is important to
distinguish between the two areas in several respects.
First, the anterior medial rostral pFC swathe is a central
part of the default network; by contrast, BA 47 is not part
of its core systems (Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter,
2008). Second, a recent work (Schuck et al., 2015) also
reported that the information related to new strategy in
a perceptual task is encoded in the human medial pFC
(but not BA 47) several blocks before and not after the
change. Schuck et al. argued that the dorsolateral pFC
favors task relevant information (e.g., Duncan, 2001; Miller
& Cohen, 2001). They suggest that the anterior medial
rostral pFC escapes this bias and so codes task-irrelevant
information. This latter proposition could also be relevant
to our study. To change strategy in our task, participants
must “zoom out” from the specific details of the game
and note the critical importance of reaching the fixed land-
mark positions (e.g., positions 3, 7, and 11 in Figure 2) for
winning. The cognitive process underlying such “zooming
out”may involve medial rostral pFC. For example, Burgess,
Dumontheil, and Gilbert (2007) have proposed with much
evidence that the anterior medial rostral pFC acts as a
gateway system to control whether attention to task is ex-
ternally or internally focused. One possibility is that sys-
tems in the anterior medial rostral pFC facilitate escape
from the specific details of the game, that is, the currently
dominant thought processes to infer the higher-level
winning strategy. This proposition also fits with medial
rostral pFC involvement in mind-wandering or stimulus-
independent thought (Buckner et al., 2008; Mckiernan,
Kaufman, Kucera-Thompson, & Binder, 2003; McGuire
et al., 1995).
What are the processes involved in major problem re-
structuring? Assume, using the terminology of Norman
and Shallice (1986), that a strategy is implemented by
one or a set of thought or actions schemas—like produc-
tions (Newell & Simon, 1972) but with an added valence
variable, which is critical for selection when triggered
schema conflict. So an Explorer strategy would corre-
spond to the four schemas shown in Table 5 (a). By
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contrast, a Solver strategy would correspond to the four
schemas shown in Table 5 (b).
There are thus at least four thought schemas present
in the Solver strategy procedure but not the Explorer
strategy one. Which is the critical one for the BA 47 acti-
vation remains to be established. However, if one con-
siders the first two Solver schemas, although they are
not necessary for the Explorer strategy, they could easily
provide a useful addition to it and are naturally related to
its schemas. Solver schema 2 involves the additional use
of a buffer to hold high valence positions; this could well
involve the inferior parietal regions, strong candidates for
the location of the phonological input buffer on the
Baddeley–Hitch working memory model (Shallice &
Cooper, 2011; Baldo & Dronkers, 2006; Paulesu et al.,
1993). By contrast, Solver schema 3 is unrelated to the Ex-
plorer schemas. As important, it is qualitatively different.
Most critically, it lacks the production system characteris-
tic of having its if-specified component strongly linked to
the recently added contents of working memory. What
triggers its activation at any particular time is not transpar-
ent. It is this temporal nontransparency, which makes it
the obvious information-processing correspondent of
the phenomenological “insight.” In the Matchstick Prob-
lem case, the temporally nontransparent process is the
dropping from the schema (Count Squares) of an argu-
ment implicitly added such as (same size).
Which cognitive process contributes to major problem
restructuring with its temporally nontransparent charac-
teristics? Here, Goel et al.’s hypothesis about BA 47 is a
strong candidate, which involved the formation of associ-
ations between previously unconnected sets of represen-
tations—high valence positions and arithmetic relations
in the current case. This corresponds to the process that
Amati and Shallice (2007) call latching and, in particular,
the form coalescence. Convergence to the successful
strategy typically follows after the participant has discov-
ered the fixed landmark positions sufficient for winning—
Solver schemas 1 and 2 (see also Figure 2). In the
coalescence process, an active temporary goal (say to
determine what is the relation between the critical
squares) combines with a supervisory process (say notic-
ing they are four apart) to generate a new procedure
(say count back in fours from the end square). We con-
jecture that the area BA 47 is specifically involved in this
coalescence process. However, the anatomical nature of
our results precludes us from being able to test this
functional hypothesis here. Future research could com-
bine this hypothesis with new approaches of fMRI anal-
ysis to further examine the role of area BA 47.
What can one make of the sex differences on the task
and, in particular, the changes in lateralization in BA 47
according to how sex is treated in the analysis? An
analysis of functional connectivity during resting state
may provide insight on the latter point. Tomasi and
Volkow (2012) found with their version of connectivity
analysis in a study of 900 participants that the inferior
frontal region is one of three cortical regions to show
sex differences in lateralization. For this region, men
showed higher rightward lateralization for short-range
connectivity and women higher leftward lateralization
for long-range connectivity. In our first analysis, men
would dominate numerically the Solver activations, but
this male bias is removed by the second analysis. This
pattern maps well onto Tomasi and Volkow’s findings,
given that the cause of the better male performance on
the task is linked to differences between sexes in their
inferior frontal architecture, which remains to be conclu-
sively demonstrated. The right dominance for the critical
process would be more pronounced in men.
Finally, it is worth asking whether there is any possibil-
ity other than major problem restructuring for the in-
volvement of BA 47 in our study. One may argue that
figuring out the winning strategy is a form of abstraction.
Chatham and Badre (2012) and Shallice and Cooper
(2013) have argued that abstract semantic representa-
tions are stored (rather than computed as we have
argued above) in the ventrolateral pFC. Importantly,
Table 5. Strategy Schemas of Explores and Solvers
(a) Explorer Strategy Schemas (b) Solver Strategy Schemas
1 If player is to play and position pawn = p; activate
schema (ascertain estimated valence for position
(p + i) where i = 1, 2, 3)
If player moves to position pawn to position p: activate
schema (Is valence at p very high?)
2 Then: activate schema (select highest estimated
valences (p + 1, p + 2, p + 3))
If Yes: activate schema (store position p in a buffer?)
3 If current round finished and if player wins: activate
schema (increase valence of all intermediate
positions visited)
At some point: activate schema (Is there an arithmetic
relation between positions stored in the High Valence
buffer?)
4 If current round finished and if player loses: activate
schema (decrease valence of all intermediate
positions visited)
If yes: activate schema (Use relation to determine
response)
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neither study distinguished a lateralized role for the right
frontal lobe, and indeed, Shallice and Cooper (2013)
were concerned with word meanings that pertained to
the left pFC. We believe that the currently available
evidence (including the anatomical data presented here)
is unable to distinguish between these possibilities.
Conclusions
There appear to be at least two differently localized pro-
cesses involved in major problem restructuring. One of
these, following Schuck et al., is located in the anterior
medial rostral pFC; it is concerned with facilitating escape
from the currently dominant thought processes. A second
concerns the active restructuring process itself. The study
provides strong support for the hypothesis put forward
by Goel and colleagues on a key role for BA 47 in carrying
out lateral transformations and somewhat weaker support
for their lateralization claim, namely that it is the right
BA 47 that is more critical for the restructuring process.
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